Introduction
Generational accounting is a new technique developed by Auerbach, Gokhale, and Kotlikoff (1991) and Kotlikoff (1992) to study the effects of government fiscal policy on different generations. ' It allows one to measure directly how much existing generations can be expected to pay, on net, to the government over their remaining lifetimes. The present value of the projected net payments by those now alive, together with 1) the government's net wealth and 2) the present value of the projected net payments by future generations, must cover 3) the present value of government spending on goods and services.
Generational accounting uses this equation -the government's intertemporal budget constraint -to infer the likely burden to be imposed on future generations. Specifically, the technique involves projecting the present value of government spending, calculating the government's net wealth, and, as mentioned, estimating the present value of net payments to be made by current
generations. The present value of payments required of future generations is then determined as a residual.
Generational accounting represents an alternative to deficit accounting for purposes of understanding generational policy. Conventional deficit accounting has been criticized on a number of grounds, including failure to account for implicit government liabilities, lack of adjustment for inflation and growth, failure to capture pay-as-you-go Social Security and related policies, and neglect of policies that redistribute fiscal burdens across generations through changes in the market price of assets. Though many economists have suggested adjusting the deficit to deal with these and other shortcomings, deficit accounting has a fundamental problem for which no adjustment is available. That is, there is no economic basis for the tax and transfer labels that are attached to government receipts and payments.
Unfortunately, the deficit depends on which labels/words are chosen to describe these transactions, and as such, it is entirely arbitrary.
For example, the government is free to label workers' Social Security contributions "taxes" and retirees' Social Security benefits "transfers."
Alternatively, it can call these contributions "loans" to the government while labeling retirees' benefits a "return of principal and interestn on these "loans," plus an additional "old age tax" that would be positive or negative, depending on whether the Social Security system was less than or more than actuarially fair in present value. Using the second set of words rather than the first to describe the same economic reality alters not only the level of the reported deficit, but also the sign of its changes over time. This is not an isolated example; every dollar the government takes in or pays out is arbitrarily labeled from an economics perspective.
Correcting the deficit for one or more of its alleged shortcomings does not, in the end, avoid its primary drawback -this labeling problem -and eventuate in the measure of a well-defined economic concept. Rather, it simply replaces one deficit based on arbitrary labels with another (see Kotlikoff [1989] ).
Generational accounting deals naturally with all of the concerns that have been raised about deficit accounting. It considers inflation and growth, including growth stemming from demographic change. It puts implicit and explicit government liabilities on an equal footing and thus avoids the danger of missing most generational redistribution. Indeed, generational accounting captures all of the policies that alter the generational distribution of fiscal burdens. Most important, it provides the answer to a major economic question, namely, whether the current course of fiscal policy, unless modified, will necessitate future generations' paying a much larger share of their lifetime incomes to the government than current generations. Thus, generational accounting exposes the generational imbalance in a nation's fiscal policy.
Italy represents one country whose citizens should be acutely concerned about such an imbalance. It has one of the most generous pay-as-you-go Social Security and welfare systems in the industrialized world. In addition, after
Belgium, it has the highest official debt-to-GDP ratio. Finally, its fertility rate is very low, which implies that a declining number of citizens will be available to shoulder the government's huge implicit and explicit obligations.
This paper develops a set of generational accounts for Italy that indicate an extremely serious imbalance in its generational policy. Unless the Italian government makes dramatic changes, future generations will face lifetime net tax burdens four or more times larger than those facing Italians who have just been born. This estimate takes into account the fact that future Italians will have higher incomes because of economic growth.
The paper proceeds by first describing general features of the Italian fiscal system and Italian demographics. Section I1 introduces the method of generational accounting, and section I11 details the data used in our analysis. Baseline generational accounts for Italy for 1990 are presented in section IV, which also explores the sensitivity of the accounts to growthrate, interest-rate, and fertility assumptions. percent of total outlays, with public pensions taking the biggest bite (26 percent). Government wage and salary payments accounted for 24 percent of government expenditures, followed by interest payments at 18 percent. The public pension system is based on a pay-as-you-go scheme, with contribution rates and benefits varying for private and public workers. The Italian welfare system also covers other important aspects of life, such as universal health care assistance, unemployment compensation, and a heavily subsidized education system.
The Italian government raises revenue mainly through direct taxes and payroll taxes. In 1990, each of these sources generated 37 percent of total revenue. The most important direct tax is the progressive personal income tax, which is applied to all income sources except interest income. Interest income is taxed at a flat rate, currently 30 percent for bank deposits and 12.5 percent for government bonds. Capital gains are taxed at a favorable rate in the case of real estate and are virtually tax exempt in the case of stocks and shares. Corporate taxes are levied at a high nominal rate (more 3 than 46 percent ) , although generous depreciation allowances and a plethora of exemptions have reduced the effective tax rate, particularly for manufacturing industries. Relative to the United States, a substantial fraction of revenues (26 percent versus 18 percent) is collected through indirect taxation, particularly through the value-added tax (VAT) and taxes on petroleum products.
Since the mid-sixties, Italy's fiscal policy has been characterized by deficit spending. The absorption of government bonds into private portfolios has been eased by Italian households' high propensity to save, an underdeveloped financial market, and, until the mid-eighties, legal restrictions on capital movements. Prior to the 1980s, the growth of public debt had been damped by low -and often negative -ex post real interest rates.
Since 1984, however, real interest rates on government debt have exceeded Italian growth rates, placing the growth of public debt on an unsustainable path. The Italian government has laid out several medium-term plans for halting the expansion of public debt, but their outcomes have repeatedly fallen short of official targets. Although the primary deficit has been shrinking since 1986, the nation has been unsuccessful in running a large enough primary surplus to keep interest payments from growing faster than the economy.
Over the coming decades, both the size and structure of the Italian population are expected to undergo substantial changes. Although the population has been growing, albeit slowly, in recent years, fertility rates have been below replacement since the 1970s, falling from 2.7 in the mid-sixties to 1.7 in 1980 and 1.3 in 1990. The latest figure is among the lowest in the industrialized world, and portends important changes in the size and distribution of the Italian population. Table 2 reports these projected changes based on two fertility assumptions. Under the first, the fertility rate gradually rises over the next decade to the level required for replacement of the population (around 2.1). Under the second, the rate moderately recovers from its current exceptionally low value, and from 1991 on remains at the European Community rate (around 1.6). The Italian population is projected to fall under both scenarios. Under the first assumption -replacement-rate fertility -total population shrinks by 8 percent by the year 2050 and 9 percent by the year 2200. Under the second assumption -fertility constant at the EC average value -the corresponding drop-off rates are 27 percent by 2050 and 84 percent by 2200! Both fertility assumptions imply a rapid aging of the Italian population.
Currently, 17 percent of Italian males and 23 percent of Italian females are aged 60 or older. By the turn of the century, the corresponding figures will be 20 percent and 26 percent under both fertility assumptions. And by 2030, more than 23 percent of Italian males and 29 percent of females will fall into this age group if the fertility rate rises to the replacement value. The corresponding figures will be 26 percent and 32 percent if the rate remains constant at the EC average value. Since a large fraction of the government's transfers are allocated to older age groups, the maintenance of current enti-tlements implies that these demographic trends will put increasing pressure on government spending.
The Method of Generational Accounting
To clarify the method of generational accounting, we write the government's intertemporal budget constraint for year t as
The first term on the left-hand side of (1) For generations born in year k, where k>t, the summation begins in year k.
Regardless of the generation's year of birth, the discounting is always back to year t. In dividing the total present value of each generation's payments (the NtSk's) by its population size, we are, in effect, discounting for mortality. Dividing the term Ps,k in equation (2) by the generation's baseyear population size forms a survival probability.
Returning to the first term in equation (I), the index s in the first summation runs from age 0 to age D, the maximum age of life. The first element of this summation is Nt,t, which is the present value of net payments of the generation born in year t; the last term is Nt,t-D, the present value of remaining net payments of the oldest generation alive in year t, namely, those born in year t-D.
The second term on the left-hand side of (1) To determine the aggregate present value of net payments required of future generations, we simply solve equation (1) for the second term on the left-hand side. While future generations, as a group, can be expected to pay this derived amount (given current policy), there are many ways of allocating the collective burden among them. To illustrate the size of the burden that will likely be imposed on future generations relative to current generations, we assume that the burden on each successive generation remains fixed as a fraction of its lifetime income. In other words, the absolute fiscal burden of successive generations is assumed to grow at the same pace as their lifetime incomes, which we take to be the growth rate of productivity.
The construction of generational accounts involves two steps. ' The first entails projecting each currently living generation's average taxes less transfers in each future year during which at least some of its members will be alive. The second step converts these projected average net tax payments into a present value using an assumed discount rate and taking into account the probability that the generation's members will be alive in each of the future years (i.e., we discount for both mortality and interest rates).
In projecting each currently living generation's taxes and transfers, we consider first its taxes and transfers in the base year -in this case, 1990.
The totals of the different taxes and transfers in the base year are those reported in the Italian National Accounts. In these calculations, we employ around our base-case assumption of a 5 percent real interest rate and a 1.5 percent productivity growth rate.
As mentioned above, inferring the fiscal burden on future generations requires knowing not only the sum total of generational accounts of current generations, but also the government's initial net wealth position and the projected present value of its outlays for goods and services. While in principle a measure of total net wealth is required, we rely instead on an estimate of net financial ~e a l t h .~ Since assessing the value of real, nonmarketable wealth is difficult, this estimate is derived in a manner consistent with the general government deficit reported in the National
Accounts. The present value of non-educational/non-health government spending is projected assuming that its future per capita level remains constant except for an adjustment for growth. We treat education and health spending differently from other government outlays. Since these expenditures represent purchases of goods and services by the government on behalf of specific age groups, we consider them as additional age-specific transfer payments. That is, our estimates of the present value of net payments by current generations exclude the projected value of education and health spending on these generations.
Taxes on capital income require special treatment because, unlike other assessments, they may be capitalized into the value of existing (old) assets.
For example, consider an increase in the nominal capital income tax rate in the presence of a provision that permits firms to deduct their new investment from taxable income immediately. As described by Auerbach and Kotlikoff (1987) and others, this will lead to a fall in the market value of existing capital. Although owners of existing capital will suffer a loss, new investors will be unaffected. For buyers of existing capital, the decline in its price will just make up for the higher tax on the future income that it will earn. For buyers of new capital, the larger immediate deduction (the amount of the deduction is proportional to the tax rate) will compensate for the higher taxes levied on the future capital income earned.
In this example, it would clearly be inappropriate to charge the higher capital income tax against the generational accounts of new investors (who are typically young or middle aged) rather than against the generational accounts of the owners of existing capital (who are typically old). Instead, generational accounting ascribes to the owners of existing assets all inframarginal taxes capitalized in the price of their assets. As discussed at greater length in Auerbach, Gokhale, and Kotlikoff (1991) , owners of existing assets can be viewed, from the perspective of generational accounting, as possessing assets valued at replacement cost (rather than at market value), but as owing a tax equal to the value of the inframarginal taxes capitalized into the market value of the asset.
111. Data Sources and Construction Figure 1 reports the age and sex profiles for the appropriation account of the general government, as well as those relative to private net wealth, income, consumption, and the propensity to consume out of wealth. Separate profiles are derived for males and females in each of the 91 cohorts. We obtain the relative profiles by benchmarking individual positions against that of a 40-year-old male.
In order to calculate the generational accounts, receipts listed in the general government appropriation account are broken down into taxes on capital, labor, and commodities, Social Security contributions, and other revenues. The aggregate amount of taxes on capital and labor income is determined by allocating total income tax revenue to capital and labor according to their shares of national income. We separate payments in the appropriation account into spending on health, education, pensions, unemployment benefits, household responsibility payments, other Social Security transfers, and other programs. The aggregate 1990 values of each of these different payments and receipts are then allocated by age and sex according to cross-section age-sex profiles, which are assumed to be constant through time except for an age-independent shift to account for economic growth. Thus, while relative receipts and payments across age groups do not vary over time, their absolute amounts expand at the economy's rate of growth.
Income and consumption profiles are computed from SHIW data. Since the survey records personal after-tax income, we derive the amount of labor taxes paid on these earnings by applying the methodology developed in Franco and Sartor (1990) . The profile for Social Security contributions is derived by applytng nominal Social Security tax rates to the estimated profile of grossof-tax individual labor income taxes, taking into account the industry, type of worker, and region of work.
Revenue from direct taxes on capital is separated into marginal and inframarginal taxes, according to the methodology outlined in Auerbach, Gokhale, and Kotlikoff (1991) . The relevant tax parameters are calculated based on estimates and data reported in Giannini (1989) . We estimate that inframarginal taxes represent 36 percent of total corporate tax revenue.
Marginal and inframarginal taxes on capital are imputed to each member of the cohort in proportion to hisher holdings of gross wealth (excluding real estate).
We obtain the age and sex profiles for net indirect taxes by applying nominal consumption tax rates to each of the 185 goods surveyed in the ISTAT CES. In the case of excise duties, we derive the implicit rate of taxation by dividing the unitary tax by the average price of the good. Since the survey records household, not individual, consumption, it was necessary to impute total household consumption of each good to each member of the household.
With the exception of consumer durables and those items whose consumption is age specific (such as toys or education fees), all consumption expenditures are imputed assuming that each family member receives an equal share. In the case of rent, the amount assigned to young household members (age 18 or less)
is set equal to half the amount imputed to adults. Consumer durables are imputed only to adults.
On the benefit side, the age profiles for health expenditures are taken from hospital and ambulatory care utilization profiles and from pharmaceutical consumption profiles, as described in Franco (1992) . For education, profiles are based on the Ministry of Education's data on expenditures per student at each educational level (from nursery school to college). Unemployment and short-term disability benefits and sick pay are imputed to citizens aged 20 to 59, assuming constant per capita payments. Maternity benefits are imputed to females aged 20 to 39, and severance pay provisions are imputed to citizens aged 55 to 65. In both cases, constant per capita payments are assumed. For pensions, profiles are taken from the SHIW, while the profiles for households* "responsibility payments" are those estimated by Franco and Sartor (1990). 6 IV. Baseline Generational Accounts and Sensitivity Analysis The accounts indicate the average amount an individual in the specified age-sex group will pay in net taxes over the rest of hisher lifetime. For example, assuming a real interest rate of 5 percent and a growth rate of 1.5 percent, the projected present values of net payments of 40-year-old males and females are $95,500 and $6,300, respectively. Females pay much lower labor income and Social Security taxes because they earn less. Notice that males aged 50 and over and females aged 45 and older have negative generational accounts. Hence, they can expect to receive, in present value, more in future transfers than they will pay out in taxes. The size of the generational accounts first rises and then falls with age, reflecting the fact that young children are years away from their peak tax paying years, whereas older individuals are in or near their retirement years, when they are on the receiving end of the government's tax and transfer programs.
To better understand the numbers in table 3, consider table 4, calculating the burden on generations yet to come, we assume that the ratio of the burdens on future males and females is the same as the ratio of the generational accounts of newborn males and females; i.e., we assume that in the future, males will be treated by the fiscal system relative to females in the same manner as newborn males are slated to be treated relative to newborn females .
Comparing the first and next-to-last rows in will pay $259,500 ($56,300), compared to $104,100 ($14,100) for future American males (females).
While future Italians will pay more, young and middle-aged Italians are slated to pay less than their American counterparts. In the case of 40-yearold American males, the remaining lifetime net tax bill is more than twice the corresponding bill for 40-year-old Italian males. The larger Italian generational imbalance is also reflected in the age at which net payments break even (that is, the age at which gross payments to the government equal benefits received). In the case of both Italian males and females, the break-even ages are 10 years less than those for their American counterparts. This phenomenon is largely explained by the greater generosity of the Italian pension system relative to that of the United States. Compare, for example, the $-111,200
generational account of 70-year-old Italian males with the $-49,000 generational account for American males of like age.
A final interesting difference between the Italian and American generational accounts is the situation of males relative to females. While Italian policy provides older females with higher net payments than does American policy, it extracts somewhat larger net payments from younger females and much higher net payments from future females.
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VI. Understanding the Generational Imbalance in Italian Fiscal Policy
Much of the generational imbalance in Italian fiscal policy reflects the pending demographic transition. Under our base-case interest-and growth-rate assumptions, the percentage difference in the treatment of future and newborn
Italians falls by more than half (126.8 percent compared with 292.5 percent)
if the population is assumed to experience no demographic change. By no demographic change, we mean that the number of people in each age-sex group in future years equals the corresponding 1990 population figures.
A second important factor in explaining the generational imbalance is the high level of Italian debt relative to GDP. As mentioned in section I, Italy's public debt has been on an unsustainable path since the mid-eighties. Blanchard et al. (1990) estimate that the gap between the actual primary balance and the level required in 1989 to avoid a debt-to-GDP runaway was equal to 5.2 percent of GDP. We estimate the effect of this tremendous shortfall on Italian generational accounts by assuming, counterfactually, that the Italian debt is zero. In this case, the percentage imbalance in generational policy declines from 292.5 percent to 189.2 percent, indicating that while the government's debt accounts for about one-third of the imbalance in generational policy, most of this imbalance has nothing to do with officially labeled government debt. Thus, focusing solely on debt can be highly misleading for assessing a government's generational policy.
A third critical factor underlying the generational imbalance in Italian fiscal policy is the scale of the Social Security system. To see the importance of Social Security, suppose that pension benefits were immediately and permanently reduced by 20 percent. In this case, the generational imbalance would decline by nearly half, from 292.5 percent to 153.3 percent. The imbalance in generational policy exposed here has been partially explored in a number of recent studies considering the future finances of the Italian Social Security system. In 1986, the Treasury's Technical Committee on Public Expenditure projected a substantial rise in the theoretical equilibrium Social Security tax rate (i.e., the ratio of total pension benefits to total income, subject to pension contributions) for the Employee Pension Fund (see Franco and Morcaldo [1986] 
VIII. The Impact of Alternative Tax Policies on National Saving
This section considers the likely impact on national saving of the various fiscal policy experiments described in the previous section. Specifically, for each policy, we first multiply each living generation's marginal propensity to consume out of lifetime resources by the projected policyinduced change in its account. We then sum these products across all living generations to determine the aggregate change in consumption.
Let Xck be the marginal propensity to consume out of lifetime wealth for a typical member of the generation born in year k, and let ANj t,k represent the present-value change induced by policy j in the remaining lifetime net payments of the generation born in year k (where j ranges from one to seven, corresponding to the policies described in tables 7 and 8). Then the effect on national saving at time t, when the policy is implemented, is equal to That is, the increase in national saving is equal to the reduction in the consumption of all generations alive at time t.
'
To compute the marginal propensities to consume out of lifetime resources, we first estimate lifetime wealth for each individual born in year k. Our methodology is outlined in the appendix. Under the assumption of homothetic preferences, marginal and average propensities coincide and are estimated by the average ratio of current consumption by each individual in an age/sex cohort to hisher lifetime resources. The last rows of tables 7 and 8 report the net national saving rate, as a percentage of net national income, induced by the corresponding policy. Recall that the net national saving rate in 1990 was around 8.6 percent. Hence, the effect of the policies represented in these tables is to more than double that rate.
The four policies described in table 7 call for reducing living generations' consumption by between 10 and 12 percent -a considerable sacrifice.
However, since the various policies are differently distributed across age and sex, they also have different implications for the level of total current consumption and national saving. Restoring generational balance through either indirect taxation or raising taxes on capital has the largest impact on national saving, while increasing Social Security contributions has the smallest.
The policies described in table 8 have a less significant impact on national saving. In the case of switching from Social Security taxation to indirect taxation, national saving in the initial year increases by 2.3 percentage points. It rises by 4.4 percentage points if Social security benefits are reduced by 20 percent over 10 years, and by 3.6 percentage points if the debt/GDP ratio is scaled back to 0.6 over 10 years.
IX. Summary and Conclusion
A serious imbalance exists in Italy's generational policy. Unless major and quite painful steps are taken soon, future generations of Italians will be forced to pay over their lifetimes four or more times the net taxes expected to be collected from current young Italians. This generational imbalance reflects the combination of an explicit liability to service huge amounts of government debt and an implicit liability to pay substantial sums to existing generations in the form of pension and health benefits. Were there a large I I projected number of future Italian workers to share these burdens, the liabilities would be less troubling. But the Italian population is rapidly aging and declining.
A large variety of measures can be used to bring Italian fiscal policy into generational balance. For example, the government could raise income taxes. The current average rate of taxation on total income (capital plus labor income) is 14 percent. To bring Italian policy into generational balance would require immediately and permanently raising the average income tax rate to 23 percent. Precisely which fiscal measures are taken and how quickly they are implemented will determine how the burden of adjusting to generational balance will be distributed over different generations. One thing is clear, however. The longer the delay in making the adjustment to a balanced course of policy, the larger will be the generational imbalance that needs to be addressed. In our base-case calculations, future generations will pay four times more than today's newborns i f a l l the adjustment i s forced on the former. But t h i s calculation assumes t h a t those born i n the immediate future w i l l share i n the larger lifetime net tax burden. Suppose, instead, t h a t the next 10 generations of I t a l i a n s are l e t off the hook and t r e a t e d i n the same manner a s current newborns a r e projected t o be treated. Then those born a f t e r the turn of the century w i l l be l e f t with a growth-adjusted lifetime net tax b i l l t h a t i s f i v e rather than four times larger than the b i l l facing current newborns.
Even a four-times larger lifetime generational account f o r future generations may be i n f e a s i b l e , however, since the required net payments may exceed the present value of these generations' labor earnings. I f t h i s i s indeed the case, then policy w i l l have t o be adjusted i n a manner t h a t r a i s e s the lifetime net payments of I t a l i a n s now a l i v e .
FOOTNOTES
See also Kotlikoff (1992a and 1992b) .
' Consider a policy that lowers the market price of an asset, such as a tax on land. Since the sellers of land are, on average, older generations, while the purchasers of land are, on average, younger generations, such a policy redistributes between the old and young. The physical land itself is unchanged, but the old are forced to sell their holdings at a lower price, benefiting the young purchasers.
The corporate tax rate was set at 47.826 percent in 1991.
The derivation of a correct measure of nonfinancial wealth is an extremely complex task, as it involves adjusting the general government's appropriation account through the following steps: i) Assessment of the market value of general government's real assets, including historic buildings and building sites as well as loss-generating public enterprises;
ii) Inclusion among current costs of the rents on those assets currently being used by general government (such as government buildings);
iii) Exclusion from revenues the profits, dividends, and other income currently earned on assets.
More precisely, our measure of net financial wealth has been derived by capitalizing net interest payments (i.e., interest payments minus interest income) at the nominal before-tax interest rate levied on newly issued government bonds (currently around 12 percent). According to this measure, net debt in 1990 was equal to 77 percent of GDP.
It should be noted that the Italian pension system has not yet reached full maturity. The ratio of the average pension benefit to per capita GDP is likely to increase significantly in the future.
The exchange rate used for calculation was 1,257 lire per dollar.
More precisely, the average indirect tax rate is increased to the level required to offset the revenue loss arising in the base year from the reduction in the Social Security tax rate. In the following years, revenue neutrality need not occur.
As previously noted, the ratio of the average pension benefit to per capita GDP is likely to increase in the absence of policy action.
Estimation of lifetime resources and of the marginal propensity to consume
Lifetime resources at time t for an individual born in year k is the sum of nonhuman plus human wealth. Human wealth is defined to include not only the present value of after-tax future earnings, but also the present value of Social Security benefits; i.e., the level of pension wealth. Of course, for a retired individual, human wealth is equal to the value of pension wealth. To estimate lifetime resources, we use the 1989 SHIW, which contains information on the value of household net worth, earnings and pension income, and personal characteristics such as age, sex, years of education, and occupation.
The overall sample of income recipients (14,552 observations) is split into two parts. The first includes working persons over age 16 and below 60 (the retirement age is 55 for women); the second group includes retirees over age 60 (55 for women) and below 91 (maximum length of life) whose income derives only from Social Security benefits. The pension wealth of the last group is computed by taking the present value of Social Security benefits.
Here, we assume that future benefit levels will remain constant at the currently observed value for each person.
To account for the rapidly increasing probability of death once average life expectancy has been reached, the discount rate in the computation of the pension wealth portion of lifetime resources is set equal to 12 percent.
For the first group, we estimate pension wealth following the previous procedure after setting the level of Social Security benefits at 80 percent of the projected earnings at age 60 (see below); the assumption is that all members of the male labor force retire at this age (55 for females). To compute the other portion of human wealth, we first fit a weighted least squares regression of current earnings against a vector of demographic characteristics and a second-order age polynomial to allow for cohort effects (see table 9 ).
For an individual born in year k, the fitted value of earnings at time t is where Xk is the vector of characteristics of the specific individual aged t-k.
Projected earnings j years ahead are computed as where g is the productivity growth rate (1.5 percent per year). Thus, the present value of earnings is given by 6 0
where the discount rate, (l+r), is set at 1.05.
For each individual, lifetime wealth is then obtained by adding hisher human wealth and share of household net holdings of real and financial assets, according to the method of division defined in section 111.
Individuals below age 16 are assumed to own only human wealth. This is computed by appropriately discounting their average human wealth at age 17 -the age at which they are assumed to enter the labor force. Thus, lifetime 7 resources of 10-year-olds is given by (1 + g) (1 + r)-7 HI7, where H17 is the average value of the human wealth of 17-year-old workers.
We assume that young dependents (below 28 years) who have not yet entered the work force will start working within a year, and we impute to them the human wealth of workers who are a year older, with appropriate adjustments for growth and discounting. Source: Authors' calculations. The equation has been estimated by weighted least squares using the fitted values of an OLS first-stage regression as weights. The sample of 9,290 observations excludes individuals with zero labor earnings, those not in the labor force, and those older than 65. The dependent variable is expressed in thousands of 1989 lire. 
